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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

remanded to the district court for re-sentencing.
DaraLum

TENTH CIRCUIT
Pittsburgh County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358
F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that federal law preempts state or
local statutes that deprive a water district of the right to provide water
to customers within the district so long as the water district is indebted
to the federal government under 7 U.S.C. § 1926 and provides water
service to customers of the district).
Pittsburgh County Rural Water District No. 7 ("District") sued the
City of McAlester ("McAlester"), a competing water provider, and
additional entities in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. The District alleged that McAlester violated its
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by restricting its ability to provide water
to customers within a protected area designated by 7 U.S.C. § 1926 and
that McAlester violated federal and state antitrust law by refusing to
sell water to the District. The District requested a declaratory
judgment regarding McAlester's ability to market water in the District's
territory, and injunctions requiring McAlester to continue selling
water to the District. The district court granted McAlester summary
judgment on some of the District's claims, dismissed the remaining
claims under section 1926, and dismissed both the District's federal
and state antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held section 1926 could protect the District's rights, and
remanded the case to the district court for determination. The court
also held that section 1926 did not entitle the District to an injunction
requiring McAlester to sell the District water, and dismissed the
District's claim that McAlester violated antitrust laws because the
District failed to prove McAlester acted as a monopolist.
The District is an Oklahoma water association incorporated by the
Pittsburgh County Commissioners to provide water for rural residents.
An amendment to section 1926 authorized the Farmers Home
Administration ("FMHA") to loan money to water associations so that
they could assist with water development, use and conservation allowed
the District to finance its actions. Section 1926 prohibits outside
entities from limiting the area serviced by indebted water districts
either by inclusion of the serviced area within another provider's
service area, or by granting a franchise for service in the area served by
the indebted district. The District borrowed money from FMI-A in
1967 and remained indebted until 1989. The District again borrowed
money from FMHIA in 1994. The District serviced areas both within
and outside the borders of McAlester.
Following the District's first federal suit against McAlester, the
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Pittsburgh County Board of Commissioners ("Board") ordered the
District's deannexation, releasing lands served by the District within
McAlester. In June 1998, the McAlester City Council terminated water
sales to the District. The District appealed the deannexation decision
to a state district court that dismissed the appeal on the grounds that
the District had insufficiently served the Board. On appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the state district court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue since the deannexation
decision was a function of the legislature. On rehearing, the Court of
Civil Appeals reversed its earlier decision, holding that the state district
court properly exercised jurisdiction, and that the Board decision
bound the District even if the Board erred in applying federal law.
In the federal action, the district court held that the District lost its
protections under section 1926 when it paid off its debt. Thus, the
only viable claims arose after the District borrowed money in 1994.
The district court also held that the District lacked protection under
section 1926 because the supply lines in place were insufficient to
make service available to areas within the McAlester city limits. The
court reversed, holding that payment of debt did not remove
protections under section 1926 and that the district court improperly
failed to consider the District's ability to rapidly improve service. The
court remanded the case to a different judge for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.
The District filed an amended complaint, the subject of the instant
case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for
McAlester on the District's claims that McAlester violated section 1926,
state and federal antitrust law. The statute of limitations barred all
claims regarding customers served between July 1967 and February
1989. The District lacked rights to provide water to properties on
which it began providing service prior to 1994 because the District
paid off its federal loan. Because the District served the properties
prior to obtaining its 1994 FMHA loan, it lacked protection under
section 1926. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the district court's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction barred the District's claims involving
McAlester's sales to the deannexed area. Finally, the district court
found section 1926 did not prohibit local governments from altering
the borders of water districts.
On appeal, the court reversed the district court's finding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the federal court of jurisdiction.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a party from appealing a
decision by a state supreme court to federal court, barring two claims:
those actually decided by a state court, and those decisions intertwined
with the decision of a state court. Because the District's claims and
remedies resulted from McAlester's decision to sell water to the
District's customers, McAlester's termination of its contract to sell
water to the District, and deannexation, and because the decision by
the state court did not cause the injury which the District sought relief
for in the federal court action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
bar the District's claims.
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The court held that the district court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction. Issue preclusion did not bar the federal court case
because the state courts did not rule on section 1983 and federal
antitrust law claims. Claim preclusion did not prevent the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction because the Board could not decide all
of the issues in the District's lawsuit due to the Board's limited
jurisdiction and the narrow scope of the deannexation proceeding.
The court decided that under the Full Faith and Credit Act, the
federal court on remand had to abide by the decision of the state court
of appeals making the annexation decision binding. However, the Full
Faith and Credit Act did not bar other claims for relief.
The court held that the statute of limitations barred all section
1983 claims arising before May 1995 because claims under section
1983 were personal injury claims. The court reversed the district court
and held that the District had a right to serve water to customers even
if McAlester began serving them prior to the loan date. The district
court decision conflicted with prior case law requiring a district to
meet a two-prong test for protection: proving it received a loan from
the federal government, and provided water service.
The court then used the two-prong test to determine whether the
District possessed rights under section 1926. For the District's rights
claims after the 1994 loan, and prior to deannexation, the court found
that under the first prong of the test, the District had been indebted to
the federal government since 1994. However, under the second
prong, the district court only looked at the District's current service
capabilities and not at whether the District had sufficient capability to
provide service in a reasonable amount of time following a request.
Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the District could make service available in a
reasonable amount of time.
On the merits of the District's challenges under section 1926, the
Tenth Circuit held that section 1926 allowed states to adjust the
boundaries of water districts. However, the court adopted a broad
construction of section 1926, resolving doubts in favor of indebted
parties. Under this interpretation, federal law preempted any local or
state policy that deprived a rural water association of territory
protected under section 1926. If, on remand, the district court found
that the District's territories were protected by section 1926,
McAlester's sale of water to customers in the deannexed area would
violate section 1926.
The court rejected McAlester's argument that such a broad
construction would violate the spending clause of the United States
Constitution.
Oklahoma could make an informed choice about
whether to accept or refuse the money because the money was a loan
with clearly stated conditions. Further, because courts had construed
it broadly, the state was on notice when it approved borrowing funds.
McAlester also alleged a taking from application of section 1926
protections to customers served by McAlester prior to the 1994 loan
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date.
The court rejected this argument because the federal
government loaned Oklahoma money, negating an economic impact,
and prior notification prevented loss of any economic expectations.
Finally, the character of the government program that gave Oklahoma
the ability to end section 1926 protections by paying off the loan did
not resemble a taking.
The court also rejected McAlester's argument that preventing
deannexation of section 1926 protected water associations encouraged
monopolization. The court held that water districts were subject to
competition because they could lose their section 1926 protection, and
because a water district charging excessively high prices may not fulfill
the statutory requirement to provide or make services available.
The court affirmed the district court's decision refusing to order
McAlester to sell water to the District. No part of section 1926
required suppliers to deal with districts and refusing to sell water did
not constitute interference with boundaries of the water district. The
statute only prohibited encroachment, by competition, not anticompetitive practices, and the District had a remedy for the anticompetitive practices under antitrust law.
As for the District's antitrust claim, the court held that it failed on
the merits. The District claimed McAlester violated antitrust law under
the essential facilities doctrine, requiring an entity or group of entities
in control of "essential facilities" to allow competitors reasonable
access to the facility. McAlester did not act as a monopolist because
the District could access water supply alternatives, because water
treatment plants other than the one run by McAlester existed in the
county, and because the District could reproduce the facility run by
McAlester.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that section 1926 protected the
District's right to sell water to customers in the District's sale area, and
remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether
the District complied with its statutory obligation to make service
available to customers in that area. The court also held that section
1926 did not entitle the District to an injunction requiring McAlester
to sell water to the District, and dismissed the District's claim that
McAlester violated antitrust laws, finding that McAlester had not acted
as a monopolist.
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